Search results for "Reverse auction"

showing 2 items of 2 documents

IncentMe: Effective Mechanism Design to Stimulate Crowdsensing Participants with Uncertain Mobility

2018

Mobile crowdsensing harnesses the sensing power of modern smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible with traditional sensor networks. Given the participatory nature of mobile crowdsensing, it is imperative to incentivize mobile users to provide sensing services in a timely and reliable manner. Most importantly, given sensed information is often valid for a limited period of time, the capability of smartphone users to execute sensing tasks largely depends on their mobility pattern, which is often uncertain. For this reason, in this paper, we propose IncentMe, a framework that solves this core issue by leveraging game-theoretical reverse auction …

FOS: Computer and information sciencesOptimizationMonitoringComputer Networks and CommunicationsComputer scienceDistributed computingMobile computingCrowdsensing02 engineering and technologyComputer Science - Networking and Internet ArchitectureReverse auctionSmart phoneCrowdsensingGame Theory0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineeringElectrical and Electronic EngineeringSensorNetworking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI)Settore ING-INF/05 - Sistemi Di Elaborazione Delle InformazioniMechanism designMobile computing020206 networking & telecommunicationsAuctionNavigationCore (game theory)RoadComputer Networks and CommunicationSensingTask analysisTask analysiParticipatoryState (computer science)MechanismSmartphoneWireless sensor networkIncentiveSoftware
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Secret versus public reserve price in an “outcry” English procurement auction: Experimental results

2015

Abstract In a set of human experiments, we analyze the impact of the buyer׳s reserve price policy in an online open outcry reverse auction. We measure the impact of revealing or not the reserve price on the buyer׳s expected cost when suppliers may be risk-averse. Results confirm that the optimal public reserve price policy dominates for the buyer when the lowest cost supplier is weakly risk-averse but in contrast with theory, the secret reserve price policy does not dominate when he becomes very risk-averse. Analysis of strategic suppliers׳ bidding behavior shows, in conformity with theory, that they react to the secret reserve price and are more aggressive when they are more risk-averse. T…

TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUSEconomics and Econometrics[QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin]Dutch auctionManagement Science and Operations ResearchBiddingGeneral Business Management and AccountingIndustrial and Manufacturing EngineeringRevenue equivalenceMicroeconomicsReverse auctionReservation priceOpen outcryProcurementEconomicsEnglish auctionComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUSInternational Journal of Production Economics
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